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111  order to iiicrease tlie ~isef~~lncss  of infoi-iiiatioii for iiia~iageiuciit,  Swedisli baiilcs 
have beguil  to focus tlieir atte~ition  on tlie measurcineiit oi  operaîioiial risk. 
Operational  risk  lias  been  defined  by  Tlie  Basel  Comiiiittee  oii  Baiil<iiig 
Supcrvision ((2001a), p. 2) as  "... the risk  qf  direct ali.tl inrì'il.ect  /»ss i-esziltiiig 
fj.0117  inatlegliate oi.,jlri/ed i~7tei~/1~1/1)i~o~esse~,  people alid  sj.steins or,  fi.o~n  e.xte/.ncrI 
ei~ents.  " As such, inloniiatioii  about o1,erational  i-islc cail be uselul ilot oiily lor 
i~iaiiagcmeiit,  but also for investoi-s aiid creditoi-s, siiice it iiicreascs tlieir oppor- 
tunity to judge thc effectiveiiess of a coinpaily. 
!i1  tliis  nrticle  cpcrational  risk  is  iiìiestigated  cmpiricaily  by  iiiekiiis  oi 
23 unstruct~~red  ii-itcrviews  with senior inailagcrs of Swedisli baiil<s.  111 tlx article. 
maily  diiuerisioiis  of  operatioiial risk  are invcstigatcd.  Iiliprovcments  iil  tlie 
disclosure of iiifoiinatioii about risks are disc~issed  botli  iil so far as sucli dis- 
closures arc beneficia1 to ii~anageiiiciït  but also. later, i11 term of tlic advantages 
for iiiclivid~ial  irivestorsicreditorc. Iri thc last section ii is argucd that reporting 
about operatioiial risk iiiay liavc ai1 iiiflue~ice  upon bankiiig structurcs, as wel1 as 
thc relatioilships between baiiks. Globalisatioii aiid a predomiiiant capital inarket are, anioiigst others, 
two factors tliat inay iiiflueiice the fiiture of a coiilpany. Globalisatioii 
inay, for iiistaiice,  increase  co~npetitioli  betweeii conlpanies aiid tlie 
inci-easiiig iiiiportaiice of tlie  capita1 iiiarket caii, at tlie  expense of 
investinent for tlie fiihire, acceiituate tlie deii~aiid  to report higli prof- 
its aiid to deliver dividends tu sliareiloiders. However, a coinpany's 
coinpetitiveiiess aild protitability could tliougli be restricted as a result 
of tlie provisioii  of iizadequate iiifoi~natioii.  I11  order to increase tlie 
usefuliiess of inforinatioii for inaiiageinent aiid briiig tlie bank in liiie 
to tlie iiew capital accord from the Base1 Coinmittee, Swedisli baiiks 
have been conceiitratiiig oil íiieas~~riiig  operational risk. The aiiii of 
tlie aí-ticle is to provide soine evidence about liow operatioiial risk is 
dealt witli  iii practice.  211  tliis article operatioiial ris]< is einpirically 
iiivestigated by rneaiis of 23 ~iristructured  iiiterviews witli the senior 
inanagers of S~vedish  baiiks. 
II. VALUE FOR A PREDOMINANTLY BELGIAN 
READERSHIP 
There are several reasoiis ~vliy  the results of tliis study are of iiiter- 
est fùr ci  preiimiiilaiely Bclgiitii aiid Dutch readeïship. Ali iii~portailt 
reasoii is tliat, wheii the Swedisli aiid Belgian contexts are coil~pared, 
several si~iiilarities  eilierge, Iri the literat~~re  it 11as  been  stated tliat 
the social context wil1 affect accouiitiiig regulation aiid liow practice 
is cond~icted  (Jönssoii (1991), Puxty et al (1987) aiid Williiiott et al 
(1992)). There are several iiotable similai-ities in Swedish aiid Belgian 
society. For iiistance, botli the iiuiiiber of citizeiis aiid living stan- 
dards are approxirnately tlie  Same, and additionally, botli  couiitries 
have  suffered  froin  high  budget  deficits  aiid  high  interest  rates 
(Jönssoii  (1  99  l), Larsson  (1  993), Lefebvi-e aiid  Flower  (1  994)). 
Iii botli  couiltries banlis have had a siiiiilar ftlnctioii. Ilistsrically, 
baiilts in both countries liave fuiictioned as deposit baiilts, as wel1 as 
iiierchaiit aiid investment baiilts. Accordiiigly, tlie baiil<s' f~liictioii  lias 
iiot priiiiarily beeii as ai1 owner of coinpanies. Lately, in botli couii- 
tries, baiiks Iiave nierged aiid acquired coinpetitors, which have cre- 
ated "new"  aiid in~icli  largei- baiiks. Today baiilts  iii botli couiitries 
have a stroiig connection to the stock inarket as inaiiagers of f~liids, corporate fiiiaiice services and so foi-til. in sliort, the bankin,  0 coiitext 
for Belgian inailagers displays many siinilarities wit11  the situatioii 
for tlieir Swedish couiitei-parts. 
Further,  Swedish aiid Belgiai-i financial  institutions aild affiliates 
worlt  side-by side geograpliically iii  soine places. 111  Luxeinbourg 
Swedisli fiilailcial iiistitutioiis  einploy hui~dreds  of people aiid hese 
Swedisli aild  Belgian  colleagues  wol-lt in  close pi-oxiiliity to  oile 
another. 
Tliere are also other reasoiis wliy the results of this study iiiay be 
of interest to a predoininately Belgiaii aiid Dutch readership. The Base1 
Cotninittee  on Baiilting  Supervision is  curreiltly worltiiig 011  a new 
capita1 accord aild iii the accord an iiicreased eniphasis is placed on 
operatioilal risk. The accord will be used widely by  internationally 
active banlts  froin  Belgium,  Swedeil, USA,  Japan,  aiid  Gerinany 
ainongst other countries. Accordiilgly, baillts are uilder a unique and 
sinlilar context of regulatioil. Iinportantly, Belgiali aiid Swedish banks 
have to  adjust tl~einselves  to tl-iis new capita1 accord and ilatioilal 
s~ipeivisors  as tlie Belgiail aiid Swedish wil1 have a cominoil docuineilt 
witli coiiiinon definiti011 of operational risk to iilipleineilt. 
Natioilal  s~ipervisors  and the Base1 Cominittee have a respoilsibil- 
ity to eilsure that tlie accord is iiiterpreted siinilarly in al1 co~~iitries. 
If the accord is interpreted differeiitly between countries, coinpetitioil 
oii ai1 iiitenlational level inay be affected, siiice yields are affected as 
a  rcsult  of differing capital recl~iirei-neiits.  There is  a ileed  mritliiil 
tlie industi-y to establish a coininon code of good practice aild one 
feasible way could be through  a  piiblic dehate, This study could be 
seen as a first step iil this effort that hopefi~lly  will be followed by siiii- 
ilas responses from Belgiaii balik inailagers and professors. 111  a p~iblic 
debate  baillt  inanagers  could  coiltribute  wit11  their  ltnowledge 
froin practice whilst professors caii contribute witli tl~eir  theoretica 
lti-iowledge. 
III.  EITERATURE REVIEW 
Financial crises may create inajor cliailges for fiiiancial accountiilg as 
wel1 as structural chaiiges (Flesher and Flesher (1984), Mesiiio aild 
Neimark (1982), Puxty et al (1987), Schuinpeter (1942), Willinott et 
al (1992)). In the beginning of the 1990s Swedetl was hit by a major 
financial  crisis  aiid  several  parts  of  tlie  ecoiioiiiy  were  affected (Larssoii (1993)). During <he fiiiailciai crisis investors aiid creditors 
lost coiifideiice in the state's ability to fiilfil its obligations and tliis 
was. for iiistaiice, inai~ifested  through short-tei-rii  interest rates of 500% 
aiid  a paymeiit systeiii iiearing collapse. Also, diie to heavy credit 
losses, diree of the four biggest baiiks  iii Swedeii were eitlier forced 
to, or liacl to consider, asltiiig the state foi- capital to i~iaiiitain  their 
business. Olie coiisequeiice of tlie fiiiaiicial  crisis was tliat  Swedish 
society was clianged o11 iiiaiiy levels. 
After  tlie fiiiaiicial crisis, baiiks  aloiig with otl-ier industries con- 
tiiiued  to iiierge  os  acquire coinpetitors  outside  Swedeii. Aiiioiig 
tlie inaiiy coiisequeiices of tliis trend, lias been aii iiicreased iiuiiiber 
of  i~idividual  anoiiymous  iiivestors.  This  developiiient  iiiay  also 
iiicrease in tlie f~lture,  due to tlie effects of tlie Europeaii single cur- 
reiicy that inay worlc  as a t001 for structural change (Abrahaiii alid 
Pirard (1999), Brittaii (1990), Biiado (1999), Verdin  aiid Vaii Heek 
(1999)). The "iiew"  class of individual aiionymous investors does 
iiot have direct access to iiifoi~iiation  tlirougli a seat on, or by family 
iiieinbers'  who  are represeiited  in,  the boards  of tlie  coiiipa~iies 
(Cliaiidlei- (1977), Cliaiidler and Daems (19801, Van Hulle (1999)). 
Iiistead,  individual anonymous investors liave to tr~lst  public iiifor- 
matioii. Iii this iiew context for Swedeii, problenis coiinected witli 
iiisider iiiforinatioii inay be created. Iiisider iiiforination caii be seen 
as tlie difference between the inforinatioii used by inaiiageineiit aiid 
îliai revealed iii fiiiancial accouiiiiiig. If t116  gap betweeii these Iwo is 
decreased, a coiitribution caii be inade towards easiiig tlie problems 
of insider trading. 
Iii addition to tlie nuinber of anonymous iiivestors tliere has beeii 
a stoclt iiiarket b00111 in Swedeii. Peiision capital, private iiivestmeiits, 
foreigii  iiivestiiieiit  and  owiiership  via  f~liids  and  so  fortli liave 
attracted capital aiid coiitributed to iiicreasi~igly  l~igher  stock prices, 
which in tuni have attracted even i~iore  capital. It is iiow the case 
that 80% of the Swedish citizeiis own shares, directly or via a fund 
(Finaiistidilingeil (2001)). The iiicreased iiivestiueiit of, for iiistaiice, 
peiisioii capital cari be seen as ai1 exa~liple  of a developiiieiit iii soci- 
ety to look for iiiarltet solutions to solve probleins. The treiid to look 
for more inai-ltet solutions is also appareiit at other levels in society 
too. For exainple hospitals that are niaiiaged by coinpaiiies are listed 
on tlie  Swedish stock niarltet. As a consequeiice the capital iiiarltet 
iiow lias an iiicreasiiigly important iiifluelice oii society tliaii before 
the fiiiancial crisis. However, as the influence of tlie capital inarltet grows, this  creates tlie  need  for useftll  information for decisioil- 
malt ing. 
Olie anioilg tlie maiiy liinitatioiis iillierent iii filiailcial  stateilieilts, 
i.e. balaiice slieet, ii1coii1e  statellient, cash-flow analysis aild their foot- 
~iotes,  is tliat these al1 coiitaiii iiifoi-ination about past eveilts. Fiiiailcial 
accouritiiig is, howevei-, also used to judge  f~iture  prospects  (AAA 
(1977), AICPA (1973)). Hellee, oile problein  is that tlie  future iilay 
turn out to be qitite different fl-0111 tlie past. Olie coiitributioii to over- 
comiiig  tlie  gap between  the future and tlie  past  may  be  to  give 
investors iliore f~~hire-orieilted  iiifoix~atioil.  These is a iieed to disclose 
inore infoi-inatio~i  about rislts, siilce rislcs are oriented to tlie futitre. 
Or as the Nobel-prize winiler M. Scholes ((1996)  p. 284) stated: 
In additioil, tlie presentation of rislts caii be seen as a coillpleineilt to 
financial statelileilts. Instead of statiilg that a compaily has a "good 
coi-porate culture"  or providiiig q~ialitative  descriptions of how tlle 
coi-poi-ate culture is iiiaintained, ai1 accouiitiiig of rislts cal1 be used to 
disclose infosination about how the corporate culture and humail cap- 
ital have coiitributed iil the creatioil of a inore successfid busiiless. 
If  for instance  operational risk is disclosed,  a reader  cali  get  an 
irnproved picture of the sustainability aild the quality of the profit fig- 
ure. Heilce, the disclosure of rislts could be seen as inalciilg a contri- 
butiai~  iowards Ihe ciarificaiiun  o1 evenls. Accordiiig to the Basel 
Coinmittee o11  Baiikiilg Supervisioii ((2001a), p. 2) they have adopted 
.  . 
the coininon industry definil-ion if  oprational nsk, ?t is: 
"  ...  the risk qf'clii.eci aiid iridii.ec/ loss 1esliltii7g.fi.om inrrdegzlnte oi*j%iled 
ii71tii.i7al pi wc esse.^. people  nïid Ls~~.~fei7~.s  oi../i.onz e.\-tei.iiol  everi/s. " 
The concept of operatioilal risk wil1 be filrtller outlined below. The lit- 
erature aboirt risk in econoinics, finailee aild accou~iting,  iileasures risk 
pi-obabilistically aiid as a consequence it is directed to the assessmeilt 
of a quaiititative measure o11  risk (Icnight and Vtirdubaltis  (1993), 
Ryan (1997), McGsuii (1995)). For instance, the literatiire lias been 
focused oii usiiig  a  price model  of valuiilg  Gilaiieia1 iilstitutions' 
off balailee  slieet contracts wlien there is a credit risk (Hull (1989)). 
The Comiiiittee on Payinent aild Settleinerit Systeins ((20011, p. 11) 
defines a credit risk as follo\vs: 
"Tl7c i.i.ck tliat a c,oi~lïtic'fi17gpni'~~  ii'ill i7ot .re///e  an  ohIiga/ioi~,fi>i  fiill  i~rlue, 
eitlzei. i1'1~ei7  die o:.  af  ci17y 1iï11e  tJ7ei.eciflei: " Aiiother coinmon risk beside credit aiid operatioiial risk is niarket risk. 
The Coininittee 0x1  Payiiieiits aiid Settlement Systems ((2001), p. 25) 
defiiies a market risk as follows: 
Accordingly, risk  is seeii as soniething  negative that  should be 
avoided (Ryari (1993)).  Alsu, iislí i11  the iittii-atixïe is ofteii treated as 
a dowiiside fiiiaiicial rneasure for poteiltial losses. 
But the coiicept of risk can be much broader tliaii a poteiltial fiiiaii- 
cial  loss. For  iristance,  a blue-collar einployee inay see a risk of 
becoiniiig uiieiiiployed. In contrast, a seiiior inaiiagei- inay see a rislt 
tliat  costs for labour in tlie coinpany wil1 lead to a wealter perfor- 
mance, wliich results iii a reduced boiius. Also an iiivestor wiil iior- 
iiially waiit to protect his fiiiaiicial capital, aiid to get a yield. Tlierefore 
there caii be a discrepancy betweeii a "blue-collar"  assessinent of risk 
coinpared to that  of aii investor or liianager, since the payinent of 
wages inay decrease tlie profit iii tlie coiiipaiiy aiid as such also affect 
tlie dividend aiid stock price. Also, tliere are probably different per- 
ceptioiis of risk withiii tliese groiips as well. For iiistance, ai1 iiivestor 
in sliares inay have to judge rislts differeiitly thaii an iiivestor in boiids, 
siiice tlie  latter receives payments of interest aiid liis capita1 back 
before tlie foriner if tlie conipaiiy perfoilns badly. Accordiiigly it caii 
be stated tliat tlie concept of risk is ambivaleiit, siiice it is broad and 
varies betweeii groups, as wel1 as withiii groups. 
From  an  historica1  perspective,  Swedish baiiks  have  focused 
inostly oii developiiig different kinds of ineasures of risks. In coin- 
parison with other branches iii Swedeii baiilts have, as a group, been 
the first to disclose iiiforinatioii  about rislts in financial accouiiting, 
inaybe because the  Swedisli supervisory  autliority, T11e  Fiiiaiicial 
Inspection, has issued  staiidards coiiceriiiiig tlie  concept  of rislts 
(Walilströiii (2000)). Receiitly several studies of operatioiial risk have 
been published aiid tliose studies can be divided into two broad cat- 
egorie~.  One category of study inethodc calculate the required capi- 
tal for operational rislt (Bethell-Joiies (2001), Halperin (20011, Lozar 
and McLorrin (2000), Blouilt (1999), and so forth). The secoild cat- 
egory is directed to a search for how to assess operatioiial risk (for 
exaiiiple  Bruggiiilt  aiid  van  den Tillaart  (2000), Higgiiis  (2000), 
Bielslti (2000)). However, iioiie of these studies einpirically investi- 
gates senior iiiaiiagenieiit perceptions of operational risk. In additioii the articles have beeii publislied in journals  for professioiial  asso- 
ciatioiis. 
Furtlier, Hodder et a1  (2001) ainoiig others, eiicourage empirica1 
studies of how rislts are looked Lipon in practice. Oile arguinent foi- 
more empirically- based studies is that little is lcnown about how rislc 
is loolted up011 by users. In addition, the author is ilot acquaiilted 
wit11  any study of operational rislt  that  is  grouilded o11  interviews 
with seilior inailagers. Based oii this, 23 senior liianagers, froin tlie 
four listed banlts have beeii iilterviewed iii ai1 unstructured way aboiit 
"Rislts aild fiilailcial reportiiig"  during 2001. Tlie iiiethod choseii is 
especially suitable wheii soinething that is uilclear is in focus, siilce 
uilstmctured interviews malte it possible for the respondent to choose 
the directioi~  of liisiher response (Beattie et al (2001), Foiltana aiid 
Frey (2000), Lofland (1971), Platt (20021, Swailson (1986)). For the 
isiterviewer  uilstructured  iilterviews  malte  it  possible  to  pose 
additional  questioi~s  to further exainiile  interesting aild important 
lines of arguinent, sucli as for exainple, operational rislc. To coilstnict 
suitable tlieiiies  for tlie iiiterviews recent literature about rislc  aild 
fiilaiicial reportisig liave been used, sucli as Knight aiid V~irdubal<is 
(1993) McGouii  (1995) and Ryail  (1997). The themes  addressed 
duriiig the  interviews  are  outlilied  iil  appeildix  olie.  The author 
hiinself conducted every interview, witli tlie aim of achieviiig more 
of a "face-to-face"  discussioil, ratlier  tlian goiiig tl-irough a precise 
iluinber of specific questions. Most of interviews  Iasted betweeii 
45 to 70 ininutes. To  be able to conceiitrate on the interviewees' 
rrspo~~ses,  stories aiid exprecciciis,  a tzpc recorder v:us  used. Tke 
interviews coiitiilued until answers were repeated (Glaser and Strauss 
(1967)). Tliis was possible since the respondents at tlie end of eac1.i 
iiiterview were asked if another suitable persoil to interview could be 
iiained. 
1V.  RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
A.  The concept of'oper.ationa1  risk 
Accordiilg to the respondents operatiosial risk is a broad concept. One 
operational rislt is recogiiised as faults with buyiilg/selliilg sllares, 
such as, for exainple  when a persoil  inay buy,  iilstead of  selling, 
100 shares. Otlier  exainples are faults  due to coinputer  systesi~s, systeiii failure, admiriistratioii faults site11  as, for instance when  a 
pawii is iiot registered in the computer systeiii, oversteppilig olie's 
autiiority, fl-aud, paymeiit fauits aiid so forth. As iildicated, opera- 
tional risk can be inanifestecl in ir,any ways. Tl~e  broad definition cre- 
ales a context where he  pheiio~iieiion  is everywhere in the compaily 
and as a consequente riiaiiy people and trailsactions are iiivolved. 
This may iilcrease tke complexity aild tlie importante of tlie coiicept 
f~trtlier. 
Siiice operatioiial  risk is such a \videspread plieiiomenoil  and it 
occurs al1 ovcr organisations, it is hard to separate ii froïn other risl<s. 
Accordingly, it cal1 bc aslted: What is the differeiice between a credit 
Loss  md  ai1 operatioiial Ioss? Wiien a bank looses money, it is possi- 
bie to argue tliat ii is an operational loss iiistead  of a loss due to a 
credit risk. For exaiiiple, a loaii loss cali be coiii~ected  witli an adiiiiii- 
istrative fault, for instance when a pawn is ilot put into the computer 
systelii, which is an operatio~lal  risk, siilce it is the administrative sys- 
tein îhat did not ~ioïl<.  Alteriiatively, one could argue that the loaii loss 
was a colisequence of a less tliaii  appropriate credit approval, i.e. 
a credit risk. To  draw the line between different rislts  is soiiieti~i~es 
probleinatic. 
111  cornparison  wit11  other  types  of risks,  operational  risk  lias 
additioiial  characterjstics. It is a risk that it is iilitiated in t21e  colil- 
pamy's  interlial context. Aiso, and maybe ri~ore  importaiitly, Swedish 
baiiics may want to  identiQ, measure  aild  report  ol?eratioiaai risk, 
but the baiilts do rlot Iiave a sufficient ariiount of data for si~odels  in 
order to compnte a ""reliable"  qua~~titative  mensai.e. To be reliable 
there is  a lieed to have representative historica1 data that reflects 
eveiits over a long period, i.e. historical data that are far-reachiiig to 
tlle exteiit tliat it caii be used to predict tuture everlts. I-lowe~~er,  at tlie 
saiiie tiilic, wc know that history arid tlie future are liever exactly the 
came. 
B.  The ~II~ILICMC  e of opel-utionlil ~.is/i  oi?  Druikr/i,q  pi.ncfic.e 
Tlie recent aiid iiicreased  altention given eo  operalional risk results 
froin several factors. Gile reason is the new capital accord  from the 
Base1 Con~mitlee.  Acconding  to the accord. a baiilt  can use itc o~vii 
models, if approved by tlie liational supervisioil autl~oriiy,  to rneasurc 
capital iequirements. Bthervvise tlie  bank wil1 have to use general 
requireiiieiits. If the banlc's own i-nodels to quantitatively ïneasrire risk are approved it wil1 result iil less miiiimu~il  capital iequireinent. As a 
consequente, yielcls wiil iiicrease for tlie baíilt. 
Ailotlier major line of developil~eiit  Eos  operatioiial risk is a belief 
that it ca11 lielp tlie maílagemeiit of tlie bank to be more accurate in its 
predictioíls of ihe f~lture.  A baiilc tliat caii identify a course of eveíits 
in  tilne  aiid take appropriate action; maybe iii advance of its coiil- 
petitors, will liave fewer costs, siiice it wil1 be the first to have ideii- 
tifled the trend. This is the maiii Iessoil leai-iled by tlie banlts as a result 
of the fiiiailcial crisis of the 1990s accordiilg to soíile respoildents. 
Accordiilgly, a weli developed reporting of operational risk cail be a 
competitive advailtage, siiice in exti-eniely  voIatile and global marltets 
tlie possibility to forecast eveats wiih a high degree of predictability 
ca11 be a inatter of strccess or failure. 
It is also a possibility, that a giveí~  forecast in the aiziiual report tl-iat 
is iiot inei, is described as a "failure"  iii aily subsequeilt public debate; 
and the coinpany riiay be braiided as being i-riailaged by incompetent 
people. In this case the failure may becorne a reality. Tlie exainple 
giveii illustrates liow sorne respondents loolted upon reputational risk. 
61ie Basel Cominittee has, however, ilot yel defiiled reputatioiial rislt, 
although it is explicitly excluded froin operational risk. 
Soiile people inay fitld it ironic that there is a deiilaiicl for capital 
for inarltet risk assessrneilt, since it is hard to find aiiy case where a 
banlt lias gone bark-upt due to inarltet risk. Iiistead, there are inar-ty 
documeiited cases wilere banlts liave gone bai-iiuupt, or oiily iiarrowly 
avoided dsing co, due to operatiorial risk sucli as, for iirstaiice, fraud. 
@ne v:e!!-kaicwil  exalml.le  ""r  is Baring's Vadl (lsy (IS"?),  Lees011 ani, 
Whitler (l996), Rawilsley (19951, Zhailg (1995)). Ailother risk type 
that ilas created banltruptcies  is credit risk, but here there  are rules 
Ihat require a i11iiiimuin ainouiit of capital. 
Accordiilg to the ii~te~viewees  tlie developiileni of rislts can be seen 
as a development iil three stages. First, a method of nleas~isiiig  credit 
risk was developed, secoiidly efforts were inade to develop models to 
ineasure inasltet risk, and, most recei~tly,  cffO~%s  arc bein;  made to mea- 
sure actlial operatio~ial  risk. More inliii-mation abo~it  model- that i11ea- 
sure credit and market  risk caii, for iilstance, 'oe  found  iíl Alexander 
(,l  9961, tlie  Bascl  Committee  o11  Baiiltirig  Supervisioli  ((19991, 
(2001b)), Coolte  et  al  (1992), Dowd (1998) and  Sauriders (1999). 
In comparisoii \vitli otlier rislts, Swedisl-i banks look upon operalioiia! 
rislt  as  sometliiilg  iiew  aiid  they  are  ilow  allocatilig  considerable 
resources iiï an effoi-t to achieve a fiiller disclosure of the plieí~oineiioii. 1. Infoi-ination of operational risk aiid tlie lielp for inaiiagement 
A focus oii operatioiial risk forces die bank to ideiitify rislt in its daily 
busiiiess operatioiis. This identification inay develop iiito discussioiis 
in many diineiisioiis. Olie consequente of sucli discussioi~s  is tliat  it 
may becoine clearer as to wliat kind  of risk level tliere sliould be in 
tlie organisatioii. As such tlie discussions iiiay malte a contribution to 
tiie iiiore efficieiit iiianagement of complex orga~iisatioiis. 
Awareness of operatioiial risk caii also be seeii as a way to get bet- 
ter interiial  management in complex orgaiiisations, siiice operational 
risk niay worlc  as a contributioii to iiicreasing  an  awareness aiiioiig 
maiiageiiieiit about wealuresses iii tlie organisatioii. For instance, tliere 
iiiay be probleilis for certaiii iiidividuals that preveiit tlieiii froin \vork- 
iiig efficiently, aiid the reportilig of opei-atioiia! rislt cali disclose those 
weakiiesses. Tliei-efore good repoi-tiiig oii operational rislt can malte a 
contribution to uiiderstanding why tliere  sometimes is a differente 
between tlie objectives and tlie results of ai1 orgaiiisation. 
On tlie back of a lilerger betweeii banits aiid tlie subsequeiit post- 
acq~lisitioii  euplioria, the co-ordiiiatioii of a "iiew" balik was said to be 
problematic. In the early stages of aiiy inerger or an acquisition, busi- 
ness oppoi-hinities inay loolc e~ioi-inously  good and it is easy to under- 
estitiiate differeiices in corporate culture aiid its irnplicatioiis oii fiitt~re 
eaniiiigs. Accordiiig to soiiie respoiideiits, manageiiieiit uiiderestiiiiated 
difficulties in iiiergers and acquisitioils. Maybe luiowledge aboiit oper- 
atioiial risk caii lielp inanageineiit to ideiitify bottleiieclts iii rnerged or 
acquired organisatioiis and malte the iiew organisatioii more efficieiit, 
siiice the iiieasureinei~t  of operatioiial ris]< caii disclose, ainongst otlier 
thiiigs, losses caused by iiiadequate processes, people aiid systems. 
Awareness of operatioiial risk cali be a coiitribution to acliieve leaii 
prod~ictioil  iii banlcs. According to Cooper (1996) leali productioii 
assumes tl~at  sustaiiied product advantage is unliltely. A lean produc- 
tioii is probably suitable for baiilts, siiice it caii be seen as beiiig rel- 
atively easy for one bank to copy another bank's  products  aiid offer 
similar services to clients. Also. lean productioti iiieaiis tliat craft and 
mass productioii are coinbiiied, but tlie liigli cost of cl-aft is avoided 
as wel1 as tlie rigidity of inass productioii (Womaclt et al (1 991)). Tlie 
systeiii of leaii production iiial<es it possible to iinprove productivity, 
quality aiid  flexibility, i.e. to produce iiiore  products,  with fewer 
resources aiid faults. With fewer chaiices of errors in the organisa- 
tions, operatioiial risk inight be reduced. L.  An additional factor iililueiiciiig baidcs 
Anotlier treiid that has caused the iieed for an assessment of opera- 
tioilal risk is tlie coi~tiiluous  aiid creative developineiit of iiew finaii- 
cial iiistruinents. These "ilew" finaileial instruineiits cail be created iii 
al1 iiiiliinited iluinber of ways, aiid soine of the iiistr~imeiits  inay even 
create their owii iilarltets. Fiilaiicial iilstruineiits can be coilstructed 
fol- ai1 individ~ial  investor or for a group of invcstors as wc11  cis  for 
botli  risk-averse  aiid risk-taltiiig people. For iiistance,  a  finailcial 
iiistrumeilt  can  consist of both  a  share aiid  a  selliiig option  aiid 
tliis  instruineilt  inay  be  created  for  inore  risk-averse  iilvestors. 
Accordiiigly,  tlie developmeilt of new products gives rise to "new" 
aiid inci-eased rislts and as a consequeilce the overall i-islc level iil the 
bank inay iilc-  ~ease. 
The ongoing aild never-eildiilg developineiit of iniiovations iil tlie 
finaileial inarkets gives rise to a greater deinand for judgenleilt.  It is 
diffic~ilt  to develop regulatioils at tlie Same pace as practice develops, 
aild regulation is actually constnicted after practice (Heiidriltseil aild 
vail Breda (1992)) i.e. regulations will always retilai11 oile step behiiid. 
Alteniatively, abstract solutioils could be created in order to get coin- 
preheilsive definitioils in regulatioii. 
Abstract defiilitions can be difficult to create and understand, siiice 
tliey cal1 cover al1 eveilts, both those, whicli have occui~ed,  but als0 
those that have not yet occurred. Accordiilgly,  abstract defiiiitioiis 
cover events tliat are not yet in our coiisciousiiess. It can be difficult 
to transpose oiieself int0 ai1 "unimaginable"  situatioil. If the worst 
coines to the worst, abstract defiilitions inay not be so usefiil, since it 
is hard to get the defiilition operationalised iii practice. One solutioil 
to avoid crises in the coiitext of endless financial iniiovations or "cre- 
ative destructioil", to use Schiimpeter's (1942) expressioii, is to maybe 
einphasise judgeinent ainoiig einployees. Hence, a focus oii coiporate 
culture coines as a iiat~iral  step and this will be developed below. 
In additioi~,  sophisticated finailcial products can be dependeilt 011 
inany inarltets, which inay iiot worlt together as expected. Fnr instance, 
a new Íïiiancial instruinent  cail be sub-divided  into several separate 
instruinei~ts,  each of then~  traded separately in a discrete marltet. Wheil 
different instruments are corilbiiied to create a ilew iilstruinent tliis in 
turn creates a ne\v  context and new risks. One way to  iiicrease the 
possibilities of ineasuring the overall risk more precisely, may be to 
divide the overall risk int0 different specified risks. One coiitribution to this trend is to start nieasuriiig operational sisi<,  siiice oile additioilal 
rislc lileasure is added. 
Before operational risk can be ilieasured in al1 fiiiancial iiistitutions, 
several problems ileed to be solveci. Duriiig the interviews it became 
evideiit that it was hard to get ai1 ailswer to questions siicli as, what 
do operational risk look lilte? What impact inight tliey have o11  profit? 
Further, no baiiks have collected data for aily sustained time period 
regarding operational rislt. Therefore soiize respondents were con- 
vinced that there is a long way to go before operatioilal rislt is handled 
i11  a sti-uctured way by al1 banks. Later in this sectioi~,  iinprovements 
for the reportiiig  of opei-ational rislt wil1 be outlilled as well as the 
possibility that assessineilt can '"d-ive" changes in stnrct~ire  witliin, as 
well as between, banks. 
In spite of the difficulties in defiiliilg the concept, there was a geil- 
era1 belief amoilg tlie iiiterviewees that operational risk cail be a help- 
fill liieasure of govei-iliiig aild coiltrolliilg activities in large aild com- 
plex orgailisations. Iii such orgaiiisatioils there are ilo natura1 contacts 
between different individuals aild probleins inay arise tliat wil1 becoine 
difficult to solve. For iiistance, it may become hard to allocate the 
siglît competeilce in time. If a coiiipany faces t00 ~iiany  uiisolved prob- 
leins tliey can becoiiie insuperable iii tl-ie worst case. Heilce, a quali- 
titative repoi-ting of operational risk caii rl?alce a isefi~l  contribiitioii  i!? 
detecting and solving probleilis in tinne. 
I11  order to be able to present a statistical nieasureiileiit it is iieces- 
sary to have data. The problem witli data is at least twofold, first infor- 
inatioil has ofte11 ilot been collected for long eiiougli, aiid secondly 
niergers os acquisitioiis have made previously  collected data prob- 
leiiiatic to use. It iiiay ilot be advisable to integrate computer data- 
bases fronl different baillts,  sii~ce  baillts, when coiiipared wit11  eacli 
oliier, can in Caci be very ciifi'erenl organisalions. In addilion, Loiiow- 
ing a merger or ai1 acquisition, a i-iew context eilierges aiid therefore 
new data are recluired. 
These is the additional probleiii for the banlts of delivering a quail- 
titative ineasure for operational risk. According to tlie  n~ajority  of 
interviewees, it is inipossible to ideiltify a list of operational risks aiid 
the locs os profit they had resulted in. In coinparisoii, the baiiks have tweiity years experieiice of data of siiare prices.  Some iiiterviewees 
explicitly poiilted out that tliere were problems in illeasuriilg tlie costs 
associated witli operational rislt. Olie commoii exainple that eiiierged 
during tlie iiiterviews was if the computer systein for ordiiiary with- 
dratvals stopped. If colnputer systeins are not f~li~ctioi~iii,,  a custo~iiers 
caiiilot withdraw inoiley aiid in this case the balik will probably earl1 
money. %ut how iiiucli will  it cost iil  ternis  of  customer loyalty'? 
For iilstailce, the bailk may lose customers as a consequeiice of tlie 
failure. The customer Inay thiiik: 
"T/iis is  elloligh. " 
Iii  addition, customers who approach tlie  bank, may  chaiige tl-ieir 
ininds. To  suin up, it inay be a difficult task to lileasure the cost of 
operationai risit. 
Analyses of operational risk are inaybe inade with regard to the con- 
sequeilces for the busiiiess. If judgeinellts  are inade that the coiise- 
queilces of tlie operation are small, then the operatioilal risk inay nol- 
be investigated filrtlier or disclosed. But what happeiis if judgeinellts 
inade are too "nai-sow"?  Theii the biggest risk for operational risk is tliat 
the people working with it thiiik that they have the right coiiipeteiice, 
2nd an appropriate structure to identify opcratiolia! risli, when iii fâct 
they do iiot. This is probably oile of tlie biggest risks for a coinpaiiy. 
Anotlier daiiger wit11 operational rislt is that there is a tendeilcy to 
place too inucli faitli iil models aiid tecliiiology. Accordiilg to soine 
i-espolidents there is a "risk" when iilore aiid more sophisticated inod- 
els are developed, siiice they move f~~rther  aiid fili-tl~er  away froin an 
awareness of the assumptioiis that uiiderpin these inodels. This may 
lead to a sicruation where usei-s, such as for iilstance inai~agement,  may 
11ot question aiid talte into accouiit the wealtiiesses  of these models. 
Tlie inodels of operatioiial risk are expected to help inanageilieiit to 
iilcilie Vette:  decisionc aiid in order to li1!5!  this knctioi:  it is iiilpor- 
tant to be aware of their weakiiesses. 
Accordiilg to one persoil these is a major risk that: 
"Risli  rti~~tiagei?ler7t  Deconies  ir gi-oltp of'i~iii~~r~~~~-f~ri~t1ii7g  niedirine tïicii. " 
According to ihis persoii, tlie measurement of risk is lilte a big black 
box,  where  different ilumbers  are delivered and i~lanagemeiit  has leumed how to react to those nuinbers iii a specified way. As a curios- 
ity this niay give rise to a ilew type of risk that caii be classified as aii 
operational risk. 
In addition it is anrisl<"  if operational risk becomes a specialist fuilc- 
tioii withiii the orgaiiisation. According to olie intervie\vee w110  just 
had been appointed to be responsible for operational risk, the coilunent 
lie had received fl-om a senior inanager was that: 
"It  je el^  renilj  Y~CIII~  thnt it  e  17051  have tiiose t121~7g.s  I/MLI~I.  co~t1.01  " 
If these is a general belief in a baiili that operatioiial risk is solved aiid 
is "uilder control" wlieii a specialist lias been appointed, tlien the coiii- 
pany will perliaps experieiice a probleiiiatic  fliture. A "departiiieiit" 
for operational risk has a specialist f~~iictioii.  The iiiaiii aim for a spe- 
cialist fuiictioii is to create, provide aiid deliver ideas and to ease the 
burdeil for top maliagement. As a coiisequeiice inaiiagemeiit should 
iiot hand over tlie responsibilities for operatioiial risk to a special 
departiiieiit for operational risk. 
Three iiiterviewees, who were respoiisible  for projects iiivolviiig 
operatioiial  risk,  ernpliasised tliat  there was  a  possible resistaiice 
ainoiig soine inanagers to reportiiig operational risk. The occurrence 
of operational risk in a iiianager's field of respoiisibility cail be seen 
as a sigii of sub-standard leadership. These is also the possibility that 
the inforiiiatioil could rebound on the manager aiid the depaitii~eiit. 
If this is the case, then it is dangerous for top management, because 
they will be uilaware of tlie scope of risk in the business. According 
to soine respondeilts these are possibilities to conceal operational risk 
in tuil-ent repoitiiig inethods. For instaiice it is possible to hide the out- 
coine of operatioiial risk iil different costs. Accordiiigly, it is a chal- 
leiige to create a coiyorate culture: in which it is possible to briiig into 
the open and to soille exteiit malie it acceptable, that inoiiey caii be lost 
as a result of operational risk. The ii~iportaiice  of establishing stiel1 a 
corporate culture will be discussed fi~rther  below. 
The iilcreased interest iii operatioiial risli has grown rapidly  during 
tlie past two years. Ackially, aiiiong al1 the listed banks oii the stoel< 
inarltet, there is ai1 ongoiiig systeniatic process of identifyiiig opei-a- 
tioiial risk. Three of tlie four banks investigated were iiot sure about 
liow to meas~ii-e  operational risk. As a result, oiily one bank did know ho\v to measure operatioiial risk. However, tlie baiilt in questioii was 
ilot williiig to disclose hotv they coiid~icted  these ~iieas~ireineiits,  siiice 
tliey were afraid tliat their coinpetitors iiiight be able to profit froni the 
disclosure of such iiifoi~nation.  This iiidicates that kiiowledge about 
liow to tiieasure operational risk is regarded as beiilg crucial. 
In coniparison wit11  maiiy otlier rislts,  sucli as for instaiice credit 
risk, tliere is no specified depai-tmeiit assigiied  to the task. Also, as 
operatioiial  risk einerges in aliiiost al1  areas of a bank's operations, 
tliere is iio single iildividual w110  cal1 iiioiiitor al1 types of operatioilal 
risk. The ideiitificatioii process is therefore ofteri i~iucli  inore complex 
than is perceived by tliose iiiernbers of staff wlio work directly with 
opei-atioiial rislt. 
Siiice operatioiial risk iii  Swedish banlzs is loolted up011  as soliie- 
tliiiig new, tliere is a lacl< of repoi-ting practice. Three out of four bailks 
believed that a lot could be dolie tliro~igh  inore frequeiit reportilig to 
mailageiiient aiid olie suggestioii riiay tlierefore be to develop routines 
for coiitrol aiid i-epoi-tiiig.  An einphasis on i-outiiies for repoi-tiiig was, 
i11 the case of two of the baiilts, regarded as being of high priority. 
111 olie of these two baiilts tliere was siiilply ai1 aniiual report 0x1  oper- 
atioiial risk produced for tlie baiilt's  seilior managemeiit. A closer 
follow-up of local operations is inaybe logical, because tliere is aii 
advaiitage for tlie bank iii beiiig able to handle risk wlierever it arises. 
As a coilsequence, persoiliiel liave been tryiiig to map out opera- 
tiotial risk through seif-evaluatioii. Olie probiein with seif-assessinent 
is that it is built oii the iiiaiiager's own judgemeilt and to a great extent 
it is therefore up to the manager himself tc decide oii thc status of the 
departineiit. Frequently aslted questioiis in self-assessments are: Is tlie 
systeiii appropriate? What happeils if a person quits? Wil1 it be iinpos- 
sible to coiitinue to worlz or oiily hardly possible? Accoi-diiigly,  tliou- 
saiids of possibilities  must be taken iiito accouilt. Therefore opera- 
tioiial  rislt inay be treated as a "residual",  i.e. soinethitig tliat wil1 
always reinain. 
A lot of tliiiigs caii, however, be doiie before  operational rislt is 
quaiitified. Iii tliis process interilal auditors and chartei-ed accoiintailtc 
liave a iiiajor fuiictioii to f~ilfil.  Aiiiong otlier thiiigs, tliey can iiial<e 
judgerneiits  as to whetlier adequate routiiies are in place. For exam- 
ple, crucial computer systeins that other systems are depeiideilt upon 
caii be identified aiid it can be decided that tlie bank must giiarantee 
the niniiing of tlie coniputer systeiii 24 hours a day. Froiil a shoi-t-terin 
perspective it seeins that action sucli as this can be very useful, siiice developing sophisticated inodels is a taslc to be accoinplislied  in tiie 
long- terin. Fui-tlier, intei-na1 auditors can werk together witli chastered 
accountants to achieve broader quaiity investigatioiis, since chartered 
accountailts  receive  iiiforination  fi-0111 tlie  balik's  staff.  Cllartered 
accountants can also. oii their own iiiitiative, start to evaluate the qual- 
ity of the operatioiis. Other suggestions for i~iiprove~nents  for reduc- 
in;  tlie dowilside of operational rislt wil1 be discussed below. 
1. Corporate cuiture 
Accordiiig  to some respondents  operational risk is a  question of 
corporate culture. It is possible to spend alinost uiiliinited iesources 
o11 processec aiid controls, but it is inore appalling to create a mode 
of  behaviour  in  organisations  as  opposed  to putting  in  piace  a 
series of rigid controls and repoi-tiiig routiiles. A wel1 f~~illictioning  cor- 
porate culture creates a ""tol  box"  for individuals to ideiltify and 
judge risk. 
A good corporate culture is dependent upon the coinpeteilee of tlle 
coinpany's  staff. When staff are recn~ited  it is essential to focus o11 
competeilce and quality. This ineans that it is necessary to focus oii 
individuals wlio possess a sound kiio\vledge of the banltiiig process 
and have tlie potential to develop their pre-existing skills. Hence, iii 
al1 fields of the bank's  operations it is necessary to recruit personnel 
who have a wide base of knowledge and who are flexible so that they 
can do eac1.i other's worlc. If several people malte tlic same qualified 
judgeinelit  this increases the possibilities tliat  good work is done. 
binproveineiits in hiriilg sltilled staff and developing a high quality of 
cosporate culture are important long-term stralegies. 
It is a inajoi cilallcnge foi the bank to build up good adi~iinistiativc 
and iiltcr~ial  control systems  If they exist tlicie wrll be relatively í'cw 
sclious incideilts  This inay also as a long-telm side effect create a 
coipolate cuitule tiial  is aieil. to inalcing judgemeitts  about aieac ot 
weiiltnesses  As a coriseque~lcc  the banlts cari  allocate icsourccs to 
weak aieas in oider to in~prove  tiiein 
Howevei, it is oT  course difficult to a~iticipatc  uiiforeseeii  eveiits 
siinply because they are by riatuie unlrkely. Some of t11e  rnterviewecs 
aigue that regardless of Iiow good ai1 iiltci~ial  coiltiol systcin the bank 
I-ias, ai1 iilciderit iike the Baiiiig's  collapse can happen  agam 111  any balik, siiice there is always a possibility tliat the banlt lias liired olie 
or two staff ineriibers wlio, togetlier, can create an "uiilikely"  situation. 
WLiaî  happened to Barings could, in tlieoiy also happen to Handels- 
baiikeii, SEB, FöreniiigsSparbaiil<eii, Noi-dea or indeed aiiy otlier balilt 
either  iii Swedeii or elsewliere. If for instaiice two Itey  persoiinel 
together clioose to work togetlier iii order to coiiiinit a fïaud it is pos- 
sible tliat they could manage to circumveilt various coiitrol systeiiis. 
To prevent tliis, it is ilecessary to build i11  different control systems iiilo 
various levels of tlie orgaiiisatioil, but, even with such precautioils a 
"Taailure" caii still occur. Soliie interviewees argue that al1 baiiks sliould 
share the costs for uiiloreseeable failures. In a way tliis is maybe a mis- 
talte. Tlie baiilc iiiay iiot focus o11  things tliat they cali do soinethiiig 
about, siiice it iiiay be believed that it is "insured"  if a serious fraud 
is committed. Iiistead, tiie brtillts should colicentrate oii thi~igs  that they 
caii do soinethiiig about, sucli as, for exainple, inakilig iinpïovemeiits 
111  adiiiiiiisirative systems. 
Many types of operational risk are probably possible to control, 
but is tlie outlay worth it? The possible outcome inust be iii propor- 
tion to tlie resources tliat are iieeded to coiltrol the operational risk in 
questioii. Iii baiilts  there are inaiiy risks that  ~iianagemeiit  are coli- 
scious of, but it is not fiuitf~~l  to control al!  opeïatioiial risk, since the 
consequences of thein are acceptable, accordiiig at least to soine of 
tlie respondeilts. For exainple, rnaiiageinent maltes  decisioiis  every 
day nor to conïrol events in tbe bank  because,  if every transactioii 
were to be colitrolled, there would be a iieed for an alinost unliinited 
mlmber  of accountarats. This is iiot defci~dable  from an eco~ioinic 
point of view. 
11 is for iiistaiice, from ar1 ecoiiomic point of view, Qifficult to defeiid 
a coliti-o1 procedure that would require that ai1 accouiitant sliould couiit 
each cash register. A balk's inanagement is wel1 aware that persoiinel 
steel money and as a iiiatter of interest tliere is oii avesage in every 
bai:lc  at least one case eacl;  year arnoiig  staff tliat  liaudle cash. li' 
accounîaiits were to be seiit out, to couiit cach cash register every day, 
rlie probability of uncovering fraud would he greal-iy increared. Tliis 
is, however, iiot done, siiice the econoinic costs are huge and tlie ben- 
etit is liltle. 
To  a  great exteiit we have so far been  diccussing probieiiis  iii 
relatioii to  iiiforrnation  used by inariageinent. Now,  if we tiarii  to 
financial accounting there are some probleiiis that are also worth 
rnentioning. One obstacle to disclosing iilfor~natioii  about operatioiial rislt is that 
it is probleinatic to present cei-tain events. For iiistailce there are frauds 
ii~volved  iii the use of banking cards. Qile intei-viewee said that tliey 
have at Ieast tïfty such frauds each year, which cost them several iilil- 
lion dollars. Sucli iiifoiliiatioii cal1 be seen as valuable material for 
investors ad  creditors. Disclosure of fraud in i~iiaiicial  accouiitiilg 
caii, however, damage the co~lildence  in a bank, because it inay seeni 
tliat tlie bank is iiot inaiiaged in ai1 appropriate way. In addition, it is 
a probleinatic taslc to inforni about procedures conceriling routines in 
qiiartei-ly aild aniiual repoi-ts. Tlie space is liinited aild it is hard to pre- 
sent evidence of wliat the routiiies have actually given and will con- 
ti-ibute to tlie coillpaily  in the fi~ture.  At the saine tiiiie actors iil the 
marlcet are iilterested in inore fliture-orieiited iiiforiiiatioii aild tliis 
"forces"  inaiiageilient to make iiiore projectioiis of future prospects. 
Tliere are also other obstacles to iiiforining tlle inarltet of opera- 
tioilal rislc.  Olie way to iiifoilii tlie inarltet about operational risk is 
maybe througl~  soiiie forin of statistica1 reporting. Theory of proba- 
bilities can be regarded as difficult to understand and it is a possibil- 
ity tliat sonie readers ca~iilot  uilderstand tlie iiifoi~iiatioil.  Accordingly, 
to  limit  the  possibility  that  iiiforiiiatioii  is  wroiigly  interpreted, 
iiiforinatioii conceniing operational rislt inay be left out in repoi-ts to 
creditors and investors. If a bank discloses that tlie possibility  of a 
banltniptcy is O,:%,  (as it was for olie bank) it is iiot ilecessarily the 
case tliat 3 out of 1 000 banlcs will actually go banl<r~~pt.  A bank wit?? 
sophisticated ineasures to identify trends caii reduce its exposures in 
tiine aild avoid aiiy potential baiiluuptcy. 
Anioiig tlie persons  interviewed there was a coininoil belief that 
operatioiial rislt in finailcial accountiilg is ilot f~illy  disclosed. Today 
there is a lack of details. Iii tlie future tliere will be inore descriptioiis 
of policy  iiistructioiis,  adiniiiistrative routines, liistorical dainages, 
descriptioils of the type of inodels used to estiinate fiiture damages 
arid quantified nieasures oi  operational risic. Tliis infosmatiori inay be 
coinpleineiited witli iilfoi~iiatioil  about ii~suraiice  cover. If the concept 
of operatioiial rislt is problematic to ideiitify aiid measure, it is also 
possible that it is difficult for tlie coinpany to protect itself froiii oper- 
ational risk. It is, however, possible to transfer the rislt to ailother 
party, such as ai1  insuraiice coiiipaiiy. This is inaybe logica1 since iil 
conventional accounting iilsuraiice is regarded as a way to niaiiage risk (Duiiiiiiig (l  97 l), Kiiiglit (1  933), Rayiies (1960), Shackle (l  970), 
Walras (1954)). Accordiiigly, a bank caii take ai1 insurance policy to 
protect itself agaiiist operatioiial risk. 
So far operatioiial rislt has been aiialysed priiiiai-ily froni two diineii- 
sioiis; iiiforniatioii  used  by inaiiagemeiit  aiid fi~iancial  accouiiting. 
It lias been suggested that operational rislt has the poteiitial to iinprove 
botli iiiforinatioii used by maiiageiiieiit  and fi~iaiicial  accouiitiiig. If 
iiiforiiiatioii is iinproved, tliis can have structural effects, the iiat~ires 
of whicli are outliiied flirther below. 
Anioiig tlie interviewees there was a trend to adjust the yield froin 
different operatioiis regardiiig their exposure to operatioiial risk. The 
possibility of beiiig infonned of an adjusted yield due to operatioiial 
risk was seeii as a major iinproveineiit for iiiformatioii used by iiiaii- 
ageinent. Previously, the yield was oiily adjusted for parts that were 
exposed to credit and inarltet risk. Now wheii baiilts start to ineasure 
operational rislt, this will influence busiiiesses that previously did iiot 
have to adjust their yields. Soine operations such as iiivestine~it  inan- 
agenieiit, private baiilting, asset inaiiageiiient aild co forth, are opera- 
tioiis with veiy little capital aiid iii comparisoii witli other operatioiis 
they have delivered very high yields coinpared with capital req~iire- 
inents. In the fiihire this yield will be lower when it is adjusted to take 
into accouiit exposure to operational risk. A majority of al1 iiitervie- 
wees einphasised that this may creztc a diffcrc~~t  view o11  profiiable 
and uiiprofitable operations and as a consequence capital inay be allo- 
cated  to  otlier  fields  of  operatioii  than  was  previously  tlie  case. 
This niay affect the stnicture within tlie bank. 
Tliere is also a possibility tliat the focus on operatioiial risk will 
lead to a split betweeii baiiks into an A- aiid a B-group, accordiiig to 
soiiie respoiidents. According to riew rules laid down by The Base1 
Coniinittee on Banking Supervision, there will be a deinaiid for cap- 
ital  cover for operatioiial rislt  (The Base!  Coniiiiittee  oii Banlting 
Supervision (2001a)). Olie problem is that the  Swedish supervisory 
board, the Fiiiaiicial Inspectioii, does not have clear iiistructions as to 
how to measure operatioiial risk. Therefore it is up to the bailks thein- 
selves to create appropriate inodels. Siiice sinaller baiiks have fewer 
resources,  tlie  bigger  baiilts  will  create  a  "best  practice"  inodel. 
Tliereafter, tlie Financial Inspectioil could codiSi this iiito regulatioiis. The \vork lvill, however, talte some years to coinplete, pel-haps even 
as long as a whole decade. Accordiiigly, we inay get a more ob\~ious 
divisioil iiito A- aiid B-banks, siilce sinaller bailks  cannot lead tlie 
work in the developinent of new ~nodels  to quantifi risk and as a con- 
sequence they will have a higher requiremeiit for capital and therefore 
a red~iced  yield. Smaller baillts may theil be eager to get access to tlie 
con~peteiice  that baillts with greater resources have acquired. This inay 
iilal<e  a coiitribution to a f~lrtlier  restructuriilg ainong banlts and tinan- 
cial institutions. 
V.  SUMMARY 
The recent trend among Swedish baiilts to focus o11  operational risk 
can be  explained  by  several factors,  interilal  as well  as external. 
Exteinally, new capital requirements froin tlie Basel Coininittee o11 
Bailkiilg Supervision have worlted as an incentive to inalte a start in 
developing  inodels  aroilnd  the  measuremeilt  of  operational  risk. 
Iiltenlally, a more diversified aild coinplex organisatioii as a result of 
inergerslacquisitioiis lias worked as a force towards ideiltifyiilg the 
need for a better pict~ire  of operational risk in a bank's daily business 
Tor  its management. Heilce, operational risk inay work as a contribu- 
tioil to create pressure 01-1 different elemeiits of costs. 
The cofisequeiices for providing iiifonr,atioil about operational risk 
could be  far-reaching. Operatioilal  risk  inay  change the  structure 
witliiii baiiks as well as between baiiks. Withiil baillts, the new rules 
for  capita1 measureinent  froiii  the  Basel  Committee  o11  Banlting 
Supervision inay work as a force for change since operations tliat pre- 
viously did iiot have to adjust tl-ieir yield for capital, will in f~iture 
have to do co. This inay lead to a situation where previously success- 
f~ll  operations inay not seem co successf~~l  any longer. Aclditioilally, it 
is only banlcs witli  significant resources tliat can affoi-d to deveiop 
quaiititative  inodels  to  measure  opeiational risk,  and  if  they  are 
approved by the Swedish Finailcial Iilspection, it will result in lower 
requiremeilts for capital. This inay lead to higher returns for tlie big- 
ges banks aiid smaller banlts may be eager to get access to kiloudeclge 
about how to measure operational risk aiid as a coilseq'iience seek co- 
operatioii in the foinl of inergers or acquisitions wit11  bigger banlts. "1 
I nei-e are severai ways to iiiiprove tiie  disciosure of operational 
risk. Tn  order to ideiitify tlie more crucial types of operational risk 
tliere is self-assessiiieilt and, in the long ixii. tliere is a need to develop 
quantitative ineasures for assessing operatioiial risk. This inay itnprove 
tl-ie picture of rislts in tlie business that senior ii1anagemeilt tuil-ei~tly 
lias. 
Additioiially, in tlie long run, corpoi-ate culture is einpliasised as a 
way to iiiiniinising poteiitial dowilsides tliat are associated with oper- 
atioilal risk. Operational risk is a factor that affects tlle operations of 
the entire coinpaiiy and it is also in soiile part hard to identify. 711  this 
coi~text,  judgeiiients  made by individuals are of crucial iiilportailce iil 
iniiiimising the poteiitial  downsides witli operational risk. Hence, a 
corporate culture caii build up a "toool-box"  to be used by individ~ials 
so they cail inalte "better"  judgeilieiits. 
Regarding disclosure to investoi-s, tl~ere  is a iieed to disclose infor- 
niatioii about routines, past events aild the aiiticipated occurrence of 
operatioiial risk. In addition, the coinpaily can infonn iilvestorslcred- 
itors as to liow it is protected agaiiist ~~nforeseen  eveilts. Hence, a dis- 
cussion of insurance coines as a natura1 step. If this inforinatioii is 
disclosed in financial accouiiting, its usefi~lness  inay iiicrease, aiid cal1 
make a useful contributioii to the more accurate predictioil of the 
fi~ture,  since iiiodels built 011  ratioiiality wil1 becoine iiicreasingly rel- 
evant iii practice. 
Tlie generalizability of the findiiigs can be seen froin different points 
of view. Olie such perspective is in the light of tl~e  i-equireiileilts of 
iiew  capita1 accord issued by the Base1 Coiniiiittee. According to a 
majority of t-he respondeilts, it is the launcli of the new accord aiid its 
eiliphasis oii operatioiial risk that lias "forced"  Swedish banlts to start 
to ideiitify, ineasure aild report on operational risk. Tlierefore it is 
liigl-ily liltely tliat the findings of tliis study would also be applicable 
to otl~er  baiilts, espeeially tliose iiiieri-lalio~ially  aclive banlts tliat wil1 
have to briiig their operations int0 line with the iiew accord. 
The definition of operatioilal risk used in the accord is ilecessarily 
abstract siilce it covers both events that, as yet, are unforeseeable as 
wel1 as those  of which we are curreiitly aware. However, tlie Basel 
Cominittee lias iiot made explicit provisions as to how to ideiitify, 
ineasure aiid report on operational risk. As a coilsequence, it is up to  elt t. balk  iiieiriseives to creaie a body  oi' goud pracDce. Froin a bis- 
torical point  of view,  listed  banlts  i.e. those  quoted  on tlie  stock 
excliange, have been at the foi-efiont in creatiilg codes of bood prac- 
tice. Listed banlts have tlie greatest resources aild are the largest in 
terins of nulliber of eiiiployees, and so fortli. Therefore the probleiiis 
that tlle listed banks have in ideiiti&iiig, measuring and reportiilg oper- 
ational risk wil1 also apply to sinaller baiilts. 
Fui-tlier, tliere are several factors 0x1  a iiiacro level that reduce bar- 
riers betweeil couiitries and malte contacts across borders more vital 
aild iinportailt iil doing busiiless. Globalisatioil,  a coil1Inoii inarltet 
withiil tlie EU and tl~e  busiiiess coilveiltioiis withiil bigger baiilts that 
create a network of coiitacts across borders, are soine of tlie pheiloin- 
eiia tliat, togetlier with the ilew capital accord, create a context iil 
which the fiildings froili tlie cui~eilt  study caii be generalised to other 
iiiteriiatioilally active baiiks. 
Notably, inany banlts  own other cosporatioils, sucli as iiisurance 
coiiipanies and witliiil a grotlp of coinpanies inforn~atioii  may be traiis- 
ferred. However tlie interviews were conducted witli tlie operatioiis 
of ìhe balk itself iii focus. Tlierefore, due to tlie liinited nature of the 
einpirical inaterial in this study, it is difficult to malte aiiy geiieralisa- 
tioiis about other brailclies, such as iiisurailce coinpaiiies. 
C. Szppoït foï  as wel1 as limitntions to the geneïaliznbility 
The Base1 Coiiiiiiittee is worlting on a new capitai accord tliat each 
countiy's supervisor can me in order to issue their own gtiidelines. 
The Basel  Coininittee coiisists of senior supervisory represeiitatives 
from Belgiuin, Canada, Frailce, Geriliaily, Ttaly, Japan, Luxeiiibourg, 
the Netlierlailds, Swedeil, Switzerlaiid, tiie Uiiited ICiiigdoin, aild the 
Uilited States. Accordiiigly, since these is only oilc capital accord aild 
it is supported widely in the world there is a possibility that tlie prob- 
leiiis outliiied in ideiltifyiilg, measuring aiid reportiilg operational risk 
wil1 be similai- al1 sound tlie world. Tlierefore there can be some sup- 
port for tiie generaiizability of tlie itey fiildings presented in tiiis suiii- 
iiiary. 
This arguineilt in support of generalizability  is also a liiliitatioii, 
sirice it is possible tliat iiational s~ipervisors  may iii~pleiiient  tlie accord 
differeiitly, i.e. they iilterpret tlie accord differently iii practice. Heiice, 
it is ilot possible on tlie basis of the eiiipirical inaterial in this article 
to arrive at aily idiosyncratic coilclusions  for the  Swedisll setting. However, later on wheil tile capital accord is iinpleineilted iil practice 
by iiational supervisors, it cail result iil idiosyilcratic results, since it 
is a "risk"  that each national supervisor wil1 interpret the accord dif- 
fereiitly. 
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